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Abstract
Studies on presidential approval in consolidated and emerg-
ing democracies identify similar determinants of popular sup-
port and show a common U-shaped cyclical pattern, with high-
er levels of support during the honeymoon period and in the last 
year of the presidential term and lower support in the in-between 
years. Since democracy was restored in 1990, Chile has had six 
presidential terms. With some nuances, presidential approval has 
evolved following the same cyclical pattern of higher approval at 
the beginning and end of the administrations. Using 66 presiden-
tial approval polls from Centro de Estudios Públicos between 1990 
and 2018 (N=82,984), we assess the effect of party identification 
and economic vote variables on presidential approval. We show 
that party identification matters in the approval of all presidents. 
We also show that economic vote variables affect presidential ap-
proval for all presidents, though the effect was stronger for Ricar-
do Lagos (2000-2006) on average. 
Resumen
Los estudios sobre aprobación presidencial en las democracias 
consolidadas y emergentes identifican determinantes similares de 
apoyo popular y muestran un patrón cíclico en forma de U, con ni-
veles más altos de apoyo al comienzo del gobierno y en el último 
año del período presidencial y niveles más bajos en años interme-
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dios. Desde el retorno de la democracia, Chile ha tenido seis admi-
nistraciones presidenciales completas. Con pequeñas diferencias, 
la aprobación presidencial ha evolucionado siguiendo el mismo 
patrón cíclico de mayor aprobación al comienzo y al final de los 
gobiernos. Usando 66 encuestas de aprobación presidencial del 
Centro de Estudios Públicos entre 1990 y 2018 (N=82984), eva-
luamos el efecto de la identificación partidista y variables de vo-
to económico sobre la aprobación presidencial. Mostramos que la 
identificación partidista importa en la aprobación de todos los pre-
sidentes. También mostramos que las variables de voto económico 
también afectan la aprobación presidencial de todos los presiden-
tes, aunque su efecto fue mayor, en promedio, en la aprobación de 
Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006).
Since democracy was restored in Chile in 1990, the five 
presidents that have presided over six presidential terms 
have experienced fluctuating presidential approval. Under 
different economic conditions and political contexts, left-
ist, centrist and rightwing presidents have seen their ap-
proval fluctuate from a low of 20 to a high of 80. With some 
nuances, all presidents experienced a U-shape evolution in 
their presidential approval, with higher approval in their 
honeymoon and end-of-the-term periods and lower ap-
proval during the in-between years. We analyze the deter-
minants of presidential approval in Chile and hypothesize 
that ideology and economic vote variables explain presi-
dential approval. We then present the case of Chile and the 
6 presidential terms that have elapsed between 1990 and 
2018. After discussing the methodology and presenting the 
data, we move on to the inferential analysis on what ex-
plains presidential approval in Chile. 
Determinants of presidential approval
There is an overwhelming consensus that presidential ap-
proval is partially explained by long-term determinants, 
like political ideology and other socio-cultural variables –
like race, class, religion or geographical residence in some 
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countries or other cleavages that explain the formation of 
the political party system (Erikson, MacKuen, & Stimson, 
2002). Voters who are identified with the same political 
party/coalition or ideology as the president are more like-
ly to approve of the president’s performance in office –and 
that will also make them more likely to re-elect the incum-
bent government (Duch & Stevenson, 2008; Nannestad & 
Paldam, 1994). Short-term term determinants, mostly as-
sociated with the economic performance of the country, 
are also relevant in explaining presidential approval (Erik-
son, MacKuen, & Stimson, 2002; MacKuen, Erikson, & Stim-
son, 1989). Voters who do not identify with political par-
ties or ideology are more likely to assess the performance of 
the president based on the observable economic variables, 
such as unemployment, inflation and economic growth (Er-
ikson, MacKuen, and Stimson, 2000, MacKuen, Erikson, & 
Stimson, 1992). 
Other short-term variables also affect presidential ap-
proval. In some countries, wars or political conflicts affect 
approval (Weyland, 1998; Arce, 2003). Political scandals 
or perception of corruption have also been found to have a 
negative effect on presidential approval (Manzetti & Rosas, 
2015). The salience of different issues varies from country to 
country, but given similar economic conditions, presidents 
will have different approval levels based on the way people 
perceive they are handling political disputes or responding 
to unexpected events like natural disasters, scandals or so-
cial crises (Edwards III, Mitchell, & Welch, 1995). Presiden-
tial approval is also affected by the ability of governments 
to deliver on campaign promises. When a candidate strong-
ly campaigns on specific promises, people will assess his or 
her performance in office based on their assessment of the 
president’s fulfillment of those promises (Stokes, 2001). 
Presidential approval is influenced by the evolution of 
democratic regimes. When democracy has been recently 
restored, presidents will benefit from a democratic honey-
moon effect. As democracy becomes the norm, voters will 
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not cut the new president the same slack they cut the pres-
ident in the first democratic period (Singer, 2015). Thus, it 
would be expected that newly established democracies or 
post-authoritarian democracies will deviate somewhat from 
the norm. As democracy consolidates as the only game in 
town, presidential approval should behave similarly as in 
other consolidated democracies. 
In every term, presidents will also go through a politi-
cal cycle. Newly inaugurated presidents will enjoy a hon-
eymoon –which will last differently for different presidents. 
When they are nearing the end of their terms, presidents 
will also see their approval rise –either because people val-
ue the legacy of their entire terms or because people are 
happy to see unpopular presidents go. In the in-between 
years, presidents will often struggle with their approval as 
they seek to advance their legislative and reform agendas. 
The honeymoon effect might be affected by national idio-
syncrasy and past legacies. For example, in a country that 
had a bad past experience with a leftwing president, the 
election of a new leftwing president might generate some 
concern among voters. Thus, the honeymoon effect might 
be less pronounced. If that new leftwing president leads a 
successful government, voters might end up rewarding him 
or her more strongly at the end of the term. The same might 
happen with the first woman president or with a very 
young president. Because same voters might be concerned 
about the new president’s capacity –or might be biased be-
cause of her gender or age– the honeymoon effect might be 
less noticeable while the U-shape evolution in presidential 
approval at the end of the term might be more pronounced.
Presidential approval might partially depend on the leg-
islative support they enjoy in congress –often measured as 
the seat share for the president’s party or coalition (Canes-
Wrone & de Marchi, 2002). When presidential terms do not 
coincide with legislative terms, or when there are midterm 
elections for legislators during a presidential term, presi-
dential approval will both affect and be impacted by legis-
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lative elections. When the president’s approval is high, the 
president’s party or coalition will likely benefit from a sym-
pathy vote for the president and will be in a better position 
to increase its seat share in congress. Inversely, an unpopu-
lar president will mean that his or her party might take an 
electoral beating and lose seats in the legislature. A more 
amenable legislature will be more receptive to the presi-
dent’s agenda and, as people perceive that the country is 
moving in the direction the president wants it to move for-
ward to, presidential approval might increase. A president 
who faces a less friendly congress after a midterm election 
might see his or her popularity decrease as people perceive 
gridlock in government –though presidents who play their 
cards in a way that successfully puts the blame for gridlock 
in the opposition might see an increase in their approval af-
ter a midterm election. 
In short, presidential approval is affected by long-term 
determinants, where party identification or ideology and 
socio-demographic characteristics are the most commonly 
mentioned, by short-term determinants, like economic-per-
ceptions and country-specific issues, by the electoral cycle 
and by specific conditions that apply to each democracy. 
Based on that discussion, we postulate two hypotheses in 
comparing the determinants of presidential approval for La-
gos and for the other Chilean presidents. Our first hypothesis 
states that political party identification has strong explana-
tory power for presidential approval. Our second hypothesis 
states that economic vote indicators account for variations in 
presidential approval within each administration. 
The evolution of democracy in Chile, 1990-2018
After a negotiated transition to democracy triggered by the 
1988 plebiscite, Chile held democratic presidential and 
legislative elections in 1989 and the new government re-
placed the Pinochet military dictatorship (1973-1990) in 
March of 1990. The conditions that determined the tran-
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sition to democracy, including the electoral rules inherited 
by the dictatorship, led to the restoration of the pre-1973 
multi-party system aligned along two dominant coalitions. 
The center-left Concertación coalition that opposed the Pi-
nochet dictatorship was comprised by the Christian Dem-
ocratic Party (PDC), the Socialist Party (PS), Party for De-
mocracy (PPD), Radical Party (PR) and smaller groups. The 
center-right Alianza coalition –which changed names for 
every election– was comprised by National Renewal (RN) 
and the far-right Independent Democratic Union (UDI). 
The Concertación overwhelmingly won the 1989 pres-
idential and legislative elections. PDC Patricio Aylwin be-
came the president for a special 4-year transition period. 
Due to the presence of unelected senators (9, who joined 
38 elected senators) appointed by the outgoing dictator-
ship, the Alianza ended up with a majority in the Senate, 
while the Concertación kept the presidency and a major-
ity in the Chamber of Deputies. Former dictator Pinochet 
stayed on as Commander in Chief of the Army and sever-
al constitutional authoritarian enclaves limited the ability of 
the new Concertación government to advance its legislative 
and reform agenda.
At the end of the Aylwin administration (1990-1994), 
Concertación PDC candidate Eduardo Frei easily won the 
1993 presidential election. The Concertación retained con-
trol of the Chamber of Deputies but the Alianza retained 
control of the Senate due to the influence of designated 
senators. Since Frei had a 6-year term and legislative elec-
tions are on a 4-year cycle, the 1997 and 2001 legislative 
elections did not coincide with a presidential election. 
In 1999, Chileans voted in a non-concurrent presidential 
election. Concertación candidate Ricardo Lagos narrowly 
defeated Alianza Joaquín Lavín in a runoff contest –the first 
since democracy was restored. Since Lagos was a mem-
ber of the leftwing PPD –farther left than the PDC, the par-
ty of Aylwin and Frei– and Lavín was a militant of the UDI, 
the 1999 presidential election was also the most polarized 
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since democracy was restored. Lagos won and became the 
first leftwing president of Chile since Allende (1970-1973). 
At the end of the 6-year Lagos term, a comprehensive 
constitutional reform package was passed. The package in-
cluded the elimination of designated senators (thus, creat-
ing an all-elected 38-member Senate) and the reduction 
of the presidential term to 4 years, establishing concurrent 
presidential and legislative elections from 2005 on. Lagos 
presided over the broad constitutional reform agreement 
and successfully eliminated all pending authoritarian en-
claves from the constitution. 
In the 2005 election, the Concertación won again and 
also clinched a seat-majority in both chambers. PS Michelle 
Bachelet became the first woman president in the coun-
try. The Concertación’s legislative majority was lost in ear-
ly 2008, when a handful of centrist legislators abandoned 
the PDC and other Concertación parties and joined the 
rightwing Alianza coalition, handing it the presidency and 
majority control of the Senate and producing a tie in the 
120-member Chamber of Deputies. 
At the end of Bachelet’s term (2006-2010), the rightwing 
Alianza coalition won its first presidential election. RN Se-
bastián Piñera became Chile’s president (2010-2014), 
though the Concertación retained a majority in the Sen-
ate. The Alianza legislative delegation had a plurality in 
the Chamber of Deputies. In the 2013 election, Bachelet 
returned to power leading a new coalition, Nueva Mayor-
ía (comprised by all Concertación parties plus the Commu-
nist Party). Nueva Mayoría signaled a leftwing shift in the 
Concertación and Bachelet campaigned on a more marked-
ly leftwing platform in 2013 than she did in the 2005 elec-
tion. Nueva Mayoría overwhelmingly won the election, car-
rying a majority of seats in the Senate and the Chamber of 
Deputies. 
Thus, the first three Concertación presidents had majori-
ty support in the Chamber of Deputies but not in the Senate. 
Bachelet (2006-2010) had majority support in both cham-
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bers, but lost it halfway in her administration. Piñera was 
a minority president and Bachelet, in her second term, had 
majorities in both chambers. 
As Figure 1 shows, presidential approval in Chile pres-
ents a downward trend overtime, with significant varia-
tions within presidential periods. Aylwin apparently en-
joyed a democratic honeymoon effect early in his term. His 
approval declined in the middle of his term and then ex-
perienced a small upsurge at the end of the term. Aylwin’s 
approval conforms to a U-shaped trend, but it was distort-
ed by a huge honeymoon effect early in his administration. 
As Aylwin’s popularity remained above 50% throughout his 
4-year term, the end-of-term upsurge was less pronounced.
Frei experienced a short honeymoon. His approval de-
clined quickly after he took office. It continued to decline for 
most of the term and then experienced a small upsurge at 
the end of the term. Thus, the evolution in his approval re-
sembled more an inverted J-shape than a U-shape. Still, for 
both Aylwin’s 4-year term and Frei’s 6-year term, their low 
point in their presidential approval was observed in years 
other than their first and last.
Lagos approval also went through a short honeymoon 
and then declined rapidly. Yet, during the second half of his 
6-year term, Lagos’s approval experienced a constant in-
crease. In the last poll under his administration, Lagos saw 
his approval marginally decline. Thus, the evolution in La-
gos’s presidential approval is more J-shaped than U-shaped. 
Given that Lagos was the first leftwing president since Sal-
vador Allende (1970-1973), his honeymoon approval effect 
might have been hindered by concerns about whether La-
gos would –unlike Allende– be able to complete his 6-year 
term. Moreover, as Lagos assumed office shortly after for-
mer dictator Augusto Pinochet was released on humanitar-
ian grounds after a 16-month arrest in London for charges of 
crimes against humanity brought against him by a judge in 
Spain, the country was politically polarized as Pinochet’s ar-
rest and release triggered a profound debate about the suc-
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cesses and failures of Chile’s transition to democracy. At the 
end of his term, Lagos’s approval was higher than his pre-
decessor’s and higher than his approval when he began his 
term, thus the small downturn seen in the last presidential 
approval poll before he left office does not contradict the ex-
pected U-shaped trend over the entire presidential period. 
Bachelet’s approval in her first term (2006-2010) ex-
perienced a dramatic U-shape evolution. Her approval de-
clined after the honeymoon, but toward the second half 
of her administration, it reached an all-time high for post-
dictatorship Chilean presidents. Though less dramatically, 
Sebastián Piñera’s approval also experienced a U-shaped 
evolution, with a short honeymoon period, a decline in the 
in-between years and an increase at the end of his term. 
Bachelet’s second term (2014-2018) also went through a U-
shaped evolution, with higher approval at the beginning of 
her term and big drop in the in-between years and a small 
increase at the end of her 4-year term. 
Thus, with nuances, presidential approval in the six 
presidential terms between 1990 and 2018 has conformed 
to a U-shaped trend. The marginal deviations from that 
trend can be easily explained by the particularities of each 
government and by the political dynamics that surrounded 
each presidential term. 
Figure 1. Presidential approval in Chile, 
 by presidential term, 1990-2018
CEP/Centro de Estudios Públicos (Conduciendo)
Source: The Executive Approval Project 1.0 (Carlin et al., 2016).
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Economic conditions also varied in Chile during the peri-
od. As Figure 2 shows, inflation was in the high 20s when 
Aylwin took office. Inflation gradually declined over time to 
stabilize in the low single digits under Lagos. Briefly under 
the Bachelet administration, inflation increased to about 
10% before the 2008 world economic crisis. Unemployment 
varied far less, between a low of 5 and a high of 11% dur-
ing the period. Monthly GDP growth shows a stable pat-
tern of sustained growth. The country experienced two re-
cessions during the period, one in 1998-1999 (Asian crisis) 
and another short-lived recession in 2008-2009 (the finan-
cial crisis). 
Figure 2. Main economic indicators in Chile, 1990-2018
Inflation Unemployment GDP growth
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Source: Authors with data from Central Bank of Chile.
There was sustained growth in the 1990s, with impressive 
results in terms of poverty reduction and social inclusion. 
The economy struggled in the 1998-2001 period, as the 
country recovered slowly from the Asian crisis. The start of 
the commodity boom in 2002 helped propel rapid econom-
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ic growth until 2014 –with a brief interruption in 2008-
2009. Progress in reducing poverty slowed down as pov-
erty reached single digits in the 2000s. Since then, poverty 
has remained low, but the social policy focus has been on 
reducing inequality and promoting social and economic in-
clusion. 
Data and methodology
To assess the determinants of presidential approval in Chile, 
we use the widely cited Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP) 
polls. Conducted regularly since the late 1980s, the CEP polls 
are the only poll series that dates back to the entire dem-
ocratic period. With a national sample and person-to-per-
son interviews, the CEP polls are highly reliable. Their da-
ta and methodology are of public access (www.cepchile.cl). 
CEP polls are conducted at least once a year. As Table 1 
shows, there have been some changes in the periodicity of 
the polls, with more polls conducted under the Aylwin term 
than in subsequent terms. The fewest number of polls was 
conducted under the Frei 6-year term. Still, there is at least 
one poll conducted per year for each of the 28 years of the 
6 presidential terms between 1990 and 2018.
Table 1. Number of CEP polls by presidential term 
Presidential term Time period # polls Average number of polls per year
1-Aylwin 1990-1994 15 3.75
2-Frei 1994-2000 10 1.67
3-Lagos 2000-2006 13 2.17
4-Bachelet 2006-2010 9 2.25
5-Piñera 2010-2014 9 2.25
6-Bachelet 2014-2018 10 2.5
Grand Total 1990-2018 66 2.36
Source: Authors with data from CEP polls, 1990-2018.
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Figure 3 shows the number of CEP polls conducted per 
year. There are more polls in presidential election years 
(1993, 1999, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017). We chose to use all 
the polls conducted even if that means that, in some cases, 
some presidents and years end up being over represent-
ed in the entire sample, our regression estimation controls 
these differences within terms.
Figure 3. Number of CEP presidential approval polls  
by year, Chile, 1990-2017
Source: Authors with data from CEP polls, 1990-2018.
Our dependent variable is presidential approval. Though 
the CEP poll offers people four options (approve, disapprove, 
neither and no answer), we recoded the answers into a di-
chotomy (approves and other), since we are more interest-
ed in analyzing the positive effects of presidential support 
rather than its variation among the three different catego-
ries. Our independent variables are gender, age, education 
(which we standardized, since the coding for the CEP polls 
has varied over time) and socio-economic status (SES). We 
also include a question on the perception of the direction of 
the country. Curiously, CEP polls offer people three respons-
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es –progressing, regressing or stagnant. Since stagnant is a 
bit more charged than “the same” –as it is the standard an-
swer– it is no surprise that few people chose the negative 
“regressing”. Having this present, we use the three catego-
ries available as a continuous variable. 
The poll also includes questions on sociotropic and ego-
tropic assessments. We keep the three answer categories 
“worse”, “same” and “better” and analyze them as a contin-
uous trichotomous variable. Since the poll includes a ques-
tion on party identification, and we analyze 5 center-left 
presidential terms and one center-right term, we coded all 
the parties as belonging to the president’s coalition for ev-
ery presidential term and all the parties that were in the 
opposition. Doing this we can compare the political parties 
across different presidential terms and political coalitions, 
independently of their political ideology. We included those 
two variables –with no identification with either govern-
ment or opposition parties as the reference category. Final-
ly, we include the indicators of inflation and unemployment 
for the month each poll was conducted. Table 2 shows the 
descriptive statistics for all the variables. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent  
variables for presidential approval in Chile, 1990-2018
Variables N mean sd min max
Presidential Support 82,984 0.444 0.497 0 1
Female 82,984 0.581 0.493 0 1
Age (6 categories) 82,984 3.428 1.649 1 6
Education Standardized 82,984 0.0148 0.993 -2.278 2.294
SES 82,984 1.667 0.696 1 3
Direction of Country 82,984 2.295 0.679 1 3
Sociotropic evaluation 82,984 1.804 0.684 1 3
Egotropic evaluation 82,984 2.263 0.676 1 3
Party Id Government 82,984 0.332 0.471 0 1
Party Id Opposition 82,984 0.157 0.364 0 1
Inflation 82,984 0.0719 0.0677 -0.019 0.292
Unemployment 82,984 0.0764 0.0153 0.053 0.118
GDP Growth 82,984 0.0135 0.0113 -0.009 0.045
Source: Authors with data from CEP polls, Chilean Central Bank and National 
Institute of Statistics, 1990-2018.
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Previous studies and stylized facts
Previous studies on presidential approval in Latin America 
have highlighted the importance of the economic vote in 
interaction with political preferences (Cabezas, 2015), pri-
or expectations (Carlin, Singer, & Zechmeister, 2015). Vot-
ers punish incumbents when the economy does not per-
form well, but economic considerations are not the only 
determinant of incumbent performance (Murillo & Visconti, 
2017). Studies on presidential approval in Chile have high-
lighted the role of economic performance mediated by ide-
ology (Navia & Soto Castro, 2015). Social class is reported 
to be a strong determinant of presidential approval (Mo-
rales & Saldaña, 2009). Personality traits explain deviation 
from approval of the president and the government (Mo-
rales & Navia, 2008). Several descriptive texts have high-
lighted deviations from the expected effect of ideology and 
economic considerations on presidential approval (Navia, 
2006).
The 6 presidential terms included in this study comprise 
periods of democratic transition (Aylwin 1990-1994), conti-
nuity in power by the same coalition (Frei 1994-2000, La-
gos 2000-2006, Bachelet 2006-2010) and alternation in 
power (Piñera 2010-2014, Bachelet 2014-2018). Some of 
the governments studied had majority control of the legis-
lature (Bachelet 2006-2010, Bachelet 2010-2014) or, even 
when they had majority electoral support, did not have ma-
jority support in congress (Aylwin, Frei, Lagos). 
The economic conditions under which each government 
assumed power were also different. While Aylwin took 
power when the economy was expanding (albeit with high 
–but also declining– inflation), Lagos took office when the 
economy was under an economic recession. Piñera also as-
sumed office when the economy was just coming out of a 
recession, but two weeks before his inauguration, a devas-
tating earthquake hit the central region of the country and 
forced the government to adjust its economic program and 
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legislative priorities. In both of her terms, Bachelet came in-
to office when the economy was expanding, but in her first 
term, she faced the economic crisis of 2008. 
The different economic conditions under which each 
president governed offers a wide variance of exogenous 
factors that might have affected the way in which presi-
dential approval evolved in their terms. Yet, while presi-
dential approval for Frei, Bachelet’s second term and Pinera 
evolved in a manner consistent with a U-shaped evolution, 
presidential approval under Aylwin reflected an inversed-J 
shaped evolution while for Lagos and Bachelet’s first term it 
showed a J-shaped evolution. 
To be sure, Bachelet’s approval in her first term also ex-
perienced a J-shaped evolution. But the explanation for 
that rapid increase in presidential approval at the end of 
her term is associated with the way in which her adminis-
tration responded to the 2008 crisis. Since Chile had ben-
efited from the commodity export boom starting in 2003, 
Bachelet promoted the creation of a sovereign wealth fund 
(SWF) when she came to power. The SWF accumulated 
huge amounts of money by 2008. When the economic cri-
sis hit, the government tapped those funds to stimulate the 
economy and minimize the negative impact of the interna-
tional crisis. Bachelet’s high approval resulted from her de-
cision to pay the political costs of saving money under the 
favorable conditions in a rainy-day fund and then having 
the opportunity to spend it when the economic crisis trig-
gered a short but deep recession in late 2008 and early 
2009. 
In the case of Lagos, the economy recovered slowly after 
the 1999 crisis. It is true that the economy was expanding 
when Lagos completed his term –and the commodity boom 
was getting stronger– but Lagos did not experience the 
kind of drastic change in economic conditions that helped 
Bachelet propel her approval to a record-breaking high. 
Thus, the J-shaped evolution in Lagos’s presidential ap-
proval needs explaining. We turn to that in the next section. 
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Inferential analysis
To assess the effect of the determinants of presidential 
approval and to test our hypotheses, we estimated a Maxi-
mum Likelihood Estimation model with a probit link on pres-
idential approval, since the variable is dichotomous. We run 
a model for Ricardo Lagos and a different model for all the 
other presidents. Because Lagos was the first leftwing pres-
ident in Chile after the transition and because the way his 
approval evolved deviates the most from a U-shaped trend, 
we compare Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006) to the other five 
presidents. Both models in Table 3 take into consideration 
the different presidential terms and time across each term 
using a mixed-effect estimation approach.
Table 3 shows the results of our inferential analysis. 
Gender and SES did not have an effect over presidential 
support during Lagos administration; meanwhile they were 
significant over the rest of the terms. We must introduce a 
word of caution here. Since we combine presidential ap-
proval for presidents of different political ideology, party af-
filiation and distinct personal traits, it should come as no 
surprise that the effect of stronger approval among lower SES 
groups reported elsewhere in support for Bachelet (Morales 
& Saldaña, 2009) is cancelled out when she is grouped 
with presidents who enjoyed higher approval among up-
per or middle class groups –like Piñera or Frei. Both age 
and education level had a similar effect over the whole pe-
riod analyzed.
Not surprisingly, those who believe the country is mak-
ing progress –or is headed in the right direction– are more 
likely to approve of the performance of the president. This 
is true for Lagos and for the other 5 presidents combined. In 
a similar fashion, as the perception of the personal or na-
tional economic situation improves also does presidential 
support. Not surprisingly, the economic vote variables are 
significant in explaining presidential approval. 
Yet, there is one important difference when analyzing 
the effect of the economic evaluations. The perception of 
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the national economic situation had a similar effect of co-
efficient over the 6 terms, on average. But a different story 
happens when we pay attention to the effect of the socio-
tropic evaluation. As the perception that the personal eco-
nomic situation improves, the support for the president also 
does, but its effect or impact was twice as big on Ricardo 
Lagos administration with respect to the average effect of 
the other 5 presidents.
This points to a greater effect of the economic vote for 
Lagos approval than for the other presidents. This differ-
ence might be explained by the fact that the election of La-
gos as the first leftwing president since Allende might have 
triggered concerns over the way the economy would evolve 
under a leftwing Concertación government –as opposed to 
the two PDC centrist previous Concertación administrations. 
When Lagos implemented market-friendly reforms and pro-
moted free trade agreements –including one that he signed 
with the U.S. in 2004– those with egotropic concerns might 
have rewarded Lagos with higher approval. 
Those who identify with a party that belongs to the 
president’s coalition are also more likely to approve of the 
president’s performance, while those who identify with an 
opposition party are more likely to disapprove. There is one 
substantive difference when comparing Lagos administra-
tion to the rest of them. The effect or impact of feeling rep-
resented by a politician in the opposition was stronger un-
der Lagos realm with respect to the other presidents. This 
means that Ricardo Lagos suffered a harder treatment from 
the individuals who did not identify with the parties in of-
fice, an effect 25% higher or worse than the other presi-
dents on average.
While inflation has no effect on the approval of the other 
5 presidents, Lagos’ approval increased with higher infla-
tion. This finding goes against the expectations, but it might 
be explained by the fact that, as Lagos’ approval increased 
towards the end of his 6-year term, inflation also began to 
increase as a result of the commodity boom. The effect of 
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unemployment is also the opposite to what was expected. 
Higher unemployment has a positive effect on presidential 
approval for Lagos and for the other 5 presidents. 
The effect of GDP variation is the opposite for Lagos than for 
the other 5 presidents. While a higher GDP variation –growth– 
has a positive impact on Lagos’s approval, GDP growth has 
a negative effect on the approval for the other 5 presidents. 
The data backs our first hypothesis. Party affiliation –
measured as identification with any of the government co-
alition parties– explains presidential approval in Chile. 
Identification with a government party explains presiden-
tial approval for all Chilean presidents in the 1990-2016. 
This confirms previous findings that ideology and party af-
filiation are strong determinants of presidential approval –
and vote choice– in post authoritarian Chile. Even though 
those who identify with political parties are on the decline, 
identification with a political party remains a strong deter-
minant of presidential approval among those who contin-
ue to identify with a party.We also find evidence in support 
of our second hypotheses. Economic vote indicators explain 
presidential approval for all presidents. Thus, while party 
identification is a strong predictor of presidential approval 
in democratic Chile, economic vote variables also explain 
variation in presidential approval. 
Table 3. Presidential support in Chile, Probit coefficients
(1) (2)
Ricardo Lagos Other Presidents
Female -0.028 0.024**
(0.025) (0.011)
Age 0.025*** 0.028***
(0.009) (0.004)
Education -0.059*** -0.072***
(0.016) (0.007)
SES 0.022 -0.045***
(0.022) (0.009)
Direction of the country 0.480*** 0.578***
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(0.021) (0.009)
Sociotropic evaluations 0.332*** 0.336***
(0.021) (0.009)
Egotropic evaluations 0.299*** 0.135***
(0.020) (0.008)
Government Party Identification 0.758*** 0.636***
(0.028) (0.012)
Opposition Party Identification -0.266*** -0.190***
(0.035) (0.016)
Inflation 10.776*** -0.977***
(2.034) (0.225)
Unemployment 0.645 9.543***
(1.789) (0.441)
GDP Growth 14.879*** -4.166***
(2.487) (0.530)
CEP poll number 0.010 -0.030***
(0.007) (0.002)
Constant -3.657*** -1.708***
(0.373) (0.287)
Observations 12,638 70,346
# presidential terms 1 5
Rho --- 0.232
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Since identification with government coalition parties has a 
strong effect on approving of the president’s performance, 
we estimated its effect for each presidential term. We esti-
mated the betas for the six presidents included in our anal-
ysis in the appendix. Not surprisingly, those who identify 
with parties that are part of the government coalition are 
more likely to approve of the president performance, while 
those people who identify with an opposition party are less 
likely to approve of the president. As democracy has con-
solidated –and as party identification has declined among 
Chileans– party identification has turned into a stronger 
predictor of presidential approval. While those that iden-
tified with opposition parties were barely less likely to ap-
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prove of Aylwin and no less likely to approve of Frei, since 
Lagos came to power in 2000, those who identify with op-
position parties have been clearly less likely to approve of 
the president’s performance. The gap in approval between 
those who identify with a government coalition party and 
those who identify with an opposition party has increased 
with every administration. In the first Bachelet term (2006-
2010), those who were in the opposition had the most neg-
ative effect on her support. In the Piñera administration 
(2010-2014), those who identify with a government coali-
tion party were more likely to approve of the president’s 
performance than ruling party sympathizers for any of the 
Concertación/Nueva Mayoría administrations. 
Given that party identification is on the decline in Chile, 
falling from a high of 70% during the Aylwin administration 
to a low of less than 30% in recent years, the effect of party 
identification might simply be reflecting the higher level of 
polarization among those who identify with parties. As a ma-
jority of people no longer identify with parties –either ruling 
or opposition parties– those who identify are more likely 
to hold stronger ideological views and, thus, their assess-
ments of presidential performance might also reflect high-
er levels of polarization –with those identifying with ruling 
parties more likely to support the president and those iden-
tifying with opposition parties less likely to do so. Yet, the 
differences between administrations leads us to speculate 
that people identified with rightwing parties were far more 
ideological in their assessment of President Piñera’s perfor-
mance in office than those who identified with leftwing parties 
were of Bachelet and Lagos’s performance. This might be 
because Piñera was the first rightwing president in Chile 
since the transition to democracy. Yet, given that Lagos was 
the first leftwing president since the transition to democra-
cy, we should have expected a similar level of enthusiasm 
in approving of Lagos’ performance among those who iden-
tified with center-left Concertación parties during his ad-
ministration. 
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Similarly, the higher rejection for the first Bachelet ad-
ministration among those who identified with opposition 
parties leads us to speculate that her administration was 
more ideologically polarizing than Lagos. Because Lagos 
inherited an economic crisis, he had to quickly implement 
centrist and pragmatic market-friendly policies to jumpstart 
the economy –a move that was a welcoming surprise for 
those who had concerns over the type of economic policies 
that the first leftwing President since Allende would imple-
ment. Six years later, Bachelet did not have the same con-
straints and her reforms, while still market-friendly, were 
perceived as more ambitious in terms of promoting social 
spending among the poor and seeking to reduce inequality. 
A similar effect happens when analyzing whether posi-
tive and negative socio-tropic perceptions on the economy 
have a significant effect on presidential approval. To com-
pare the effect of those variables over time, we estimated 
the betas for sociotropic perceptions on the economy on 
presidential approval for every presidential term, included 
in the appendix. The effect of the sociotropic perceptions on 
the economy have decreased over time. This should not be 
surprising. When democracy was restored in 1990, there 
were widespread concerns over the kind of economic pol-
icies the new center-left Concertación government would 
implement. The military dictatorship and rightwing parties 
strongly campaigned on fear mongering about the econom-
ic policies that their centrist and leftwing opponents would 
implement if elected. As the Concertación administrations 
demonstrated that they were responsible at handling the 
economy, the effect of sociotropic views declined. In more 
recent years, the gap in presidential approval among those 
with positive and negative sociotropic views has declined 
even further. This is consistent with the increase in ideol-
ogy as a determinant factor of presidential approval in re-
cent years. Yet, since a growing majority of Chileans do not 
identify with political parties, the decreasing importance 
of socio-tropic views –the economic vote variables– in ex-
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plaining presidential approval begs the question of what 
drives presidential approval among those –a growing ma-
jority of Chileans– who do not identify with political par-
ties.
Conclusion
Contributions on the determinants of presidential approv-
al highlight the importance of party identification and eco-
nomic vote indicators. In analyzing presidential approval in 
Chile between 1990 and 2018, we find variance in the evo-
lution of presidential approval for different governments. 
While we do find a U-shaped trend in the approval of 3 of 
the six presidents, there is one president –Aylwin (1990-
1994)– who experienced an inverted J-shaped approval 
(something that can be attributed to a strong honeymoon 
effect for the first president under the new democratic pe-
riod) and two presidents –Lagos (2000-2006) and Bachelet 
(2006-2010)– who experienced a J-shaped approval, with 
record-breaking high approval during the second half of 
their administrations. 
With probit estimations using 66 presidential approval 
polls conducted between 1990 and 2018, we showed that 
party identification explains presidential approval for all 
presidents. We also show that socio-tropic economic vote 
variables explain presidential approval for all presidents as 
well, but that ego-tropic assessments better explain presi-
dential approval for Lagos. As party identification becomes 
a stronger determinant of presidential approval and the ex-
planatory power of socio-tropic concerns lose strength, our 
study invites further research on what explains presiden-
tial approval among the growing number of Chileans who 
do not identify with political parties. If party identification 
–and perhaps even ideology– are strong determinants of 
approval, further research ought to look into what explains 
approval among those who do not identify with political 
parties or who do not express ideological preferences. 
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Appendix 1. Probit estimations on presidential approval in Chile 
by presidents, 1990-2018
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aylwin Frei Lagos Bachelet1 Piñera Bachelet 2
Female -0.114*** -0.023 -0.028 0.195*** 0.051* 0.125***
(1= female) (0.021) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.029)
Age 0.031*** 0.000 0.025*** -0.001 0.038*** 0.049***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Education -0.013 -0.102*** -0.059*** -0.106*** -0.046*** -0.157***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018)
SES 0.028* -0.028 0.022 -0.137*** 0.055** -0.159***
(0.017) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024)
Sociotropic 0.376*** 0.370*** 0.332*** 0.285*** 0.305*** 0.295***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022)
Egotropic 0.150*** 0.149*** 0.299*** 0.097*** 0.143*** 0.084***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.024)
Progress of 0.628*** 0.542*** 0.480*** 0.581*** 0.523*** 0.497***
country (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023)
Gov party id 0.687*** 0.563*** 0.758*** 0.655*** 0.965*** 0.697***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.028) (0.030) (0.041) (0.037)
Opposition -0.136*** -0.012 -0.266*** -0.410*** -0.163*** -0.397***
Party id (0.030) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.033) (0.064)
Inflation 0.989* 1.203 10.776*** -4.096*** -30.038*** -17.373***
(0.539) (2.616) (2.034) (0.440) (2.021) (2.689)
Unemployment -5.714*** 3.489*** 0.645 7.256*** -51.813*** -2.134
(1.734) (0.917) (1.789) (1.162) (9.290) (5.193)
GDP growth -4.005*** -6.474*** 14.879*** -1.728 11.729*** 11.703***
(0.718) (1.590) (2.487) (1.501) (4.474) (2.669)
Cep poll # -0.053*** -0.014 0.010 0.074*** -0.161*** -0.117***
(0.008) (0.015) (0.007) (0.006) (0.020) (0.011)
Constant -1.499*** -2.415*** -3.657*** -6.549*** 11.693*** 7.159***
(0.306) (0.718) (0.373) (0.335) (1.923) (0.856)
Observations 19,164 15,128 12,638 12,697 12,643 10,714
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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